

The Soviet High Command A Military Political History 1918 1941

The Last 100 Days Strategic Intelligence The Soviet High Command Hitler's Panzers East Zhukov The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944 The Soviet High Command High Command Commanding the Army of the Potomac Retreat from Moscow Soviet Defensive Tactics At Kursk, July 1943 The Soviet Military Experience The German Soldier in World War II Washington Command Post: The Operations Division Defense Soviet Military Operational Art Stalin and the Bomb Inside Hitler's High Command The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989 In the Shadow of the Red Banner War of the Rats Marshal of Victory Stalingrad Hitler's Traitor Operation Barbarossa The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986 The German Campaign in Russia Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War Zhukov's Greatest Defeat The Soviet High Command: a Military-political History, 1918-1941 500 Days Infantry Soldier The Soviet Airborne Experience Stalin's Wars A Cardboard Castle? The American Review on the Soviet Union The Great Terror The Culture of Military Organizations The History of Soviet Airborne Forces

The Last 100 Days

The classic and “utterly engrossing” study of Stalin’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb during the Cold War by the renowned political scientist and historian (Foreign Affairs). For forty years the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race dominated world politics, yet the Soviet nuclear establishment was shrouded in secrecy. Then, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, David Holloway pulled back the Iron Curtain with his “marvelous, groundbreaking study” Stalin and the Bomb (The New Yorker). How did the Soviet Union build its atomic and hydrogen bombs? What role did espionage play? How did the American atomic monopoly affect Stalin's foreign policy? What was the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders? David Holloway answers these questions by tracing the dramatic story of Soviet nuclear policy from developments in physics in the 1920s to the testing of the hydrogen bomb and the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the mid-1950s. This magisterial history throws light on Soviet policy at the height of the Cold War, illuminates a central element of the Stalinist system, and puts into perspective the tragic legacy of this program—environmental damage, a vast network of institutes and factories, and a huge stockpile of unwanted weapons.

Strategic Intelligence

Examines how military culture forms and changes, as well as its impact on the effectiveness of military organizations.

The Soviet High Command

The recent transformations in the USSR are nowhere more evident than in the Soviet military. Top-level military officers have been relieved of their positions, Gorbachev has warned of lean times for the military, the symbolic role of the armed forces has been downgraded, and the concept of "military sufficiency" points to major modifications in Soviet force structure. Contrary to some who see Gorbachev as a Sir Galahad out to slay the evil military high command, Dale Herspring concludes that the relationship between the highest Soviet political and military leaders is at the moment more symbiotic than conflictual. In this first in-depth study of the evolution of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union from 1967 to the present, he shows how the views of senior military officers have varied over time: currently, even if the members of the high command do not like all Gorbachev's changes, they understand the need for them and are prepared to live with them. As Herspring looks at the personalities and politics of eight top military figures, he reveals that the most important of them, Ogarkov, was the first senior Soviet military officer to understand the value of working with the political leadership. Ogarkov believed that the arms control and dtente processes, if carefully managed, could enhance the national security of the USSR. In Gorbachev, the Soviet military has found the type of individual that Ogarkov was seeking. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Hitler's Panzers East

Zhukov

For six months in 1942, Stalingrad is the center of a titanic struggle between the Russian and German armies—the bloodiest campaign in mankind's long history of warfare. The outcome is pivotal. If Hitler's forces are not stopped, Russia will fall. And with it, the world. German soldiers call the battle Rattenkrieg, War of the Rats. The combat is horrific, as soldiers die in the smoking cellars and trenches of a ruined city. Through this twisted carnage stalk two men—one Russian, one German—each the top sniper in his respective army. These two marksmen are equally matched in both skill and tenacity. Each man has his own mission: to find his counterpart—and kill him. But an American woman trapped in Russia complicates this extraordinary duel. Joining the Russian sniper's cadre, she soon becomes one of his most talented assassins—and perhaps his greatest weakness. Based on a true story, this is the harrowing tale of two adversaries enmeshed in their own private war—and whose fortunes will help decide the fate of the world. From the Paperback edition.

The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944

David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level and its connection with deep battle, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its refinement and application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.

The Soviet High Command

Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, hero of Leningrad, defender of Moscow and Stalingrad, commander of the victorious Red Army at Berlin, was the most decorated soldier in Soviet history. Yet for many years Zhukov was relegated to the status of "unperson" in his homeland. Now, following glasnost and the fall of the Soviet Union, Zhukov is being restored to his rightful place in history. In this completely updated version of his classic 1971 biography of Zhukov, Otto Preston Chaney provides the definitive account of the man and his achievements. Zhukov's career spanned most of the Soviet period, reflecting the turmoil of the civil war, the hardships endured by the Russian people in World War II, the brief postwar optimism evidenced by the friendship between Zhukov and Eisenhower, repression in Poland and Hungary, and the rise and fall of such political figures as Stalin, Beria, and Krushchev. The story of Russia's greatest soldier thus offers many insights into the history of the Soviet Union itself.

High Command

The purpose of this text is to provide the Army with a factual account of the organization and operations of the Soviet resistance movement behind the German forces on the Eastern Front during World War II. This movement offers a particularly valuable case study, for it can be viewed both in relation to the German occupation in the Soviet Union and to the offensive and defensive operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. The scope of the study includes an over-all picture of a quasi-military organization in relation to a larger conflict between two regular armies. It is not a study in partisan tactics, nor is it intended to be. German measures taken to combat the partisan movement are sketched in, but the story in large part remains that of an organization and how it operated. The German planning for the invasion of Russia is treated at some length because many of the circumstances which favored the rise and development of the movement had their bases in errors the Germans made in their initial planning. The operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army are likewise described in considerable detail as the backdrop against which the operations of the partisan units are projected. Because of the lack of reliable Soviet sources, the story has been told much as the Germans recorded it. German documents written during the course of World War II constitute the principal sources, but many survivors who had experience in Russia have made important contributions based upon their personal experience.

Commanding the Army of the Potomac

Retreat from Moscow

Soviet Defensive Tactics At Kursk, July 1943

"Stephen Taaffe takes a close look at this command cadre, examining who was appointed to these positions, why they were appointed, and why so many of them ultimately failed to fulfill their responsibilities. He demonstrates that ambitious officers such as Gouverneur Warren, John Reynolds, and Winfield Scott Hancock employed all the weapons at their disposal, from personal connections to exaggerated accounts of prowess in combat, to claw their way into these important posts."

"Once there, however, as Taaffe reveals, many of these officers failed to navigate the tricky and ever-changing political currents that swirled around the Army of the Potomac. As a result, only three of them managed to retain their commands for more than a year, and their machinations caused considerable turmoil in the army's high command structure."--BOOK JACKET.

The Soviet Military Experience

At Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin and in virtually all the principal battles on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, Georgy Zhukov played a major role. He was Stalin's pre-eminent general throughout the conflict, and in his autobiography he chronicled his brilliant career as he saw it and wanted it to be seen. His memoirs are fascinating reading because they portray in first-hand detail, through the entire course of the war, the thinking and decision-making at the highest level of the Soviet command. They are one of the indispensable sources for studying the struggle in the east, and they give the reader an intriguing insight into Zhukov the man as well as Zhukov the commander. This new edition of the memoirs, which were first published in heavily censored form in Russian in 1969, features a new introduction by Professor Geoffrey Roberts who summarizes important additional material that was omitted from previous editions. He also provides, in an appendix, a translation of Zhukov's account of the 1953-7 period as well as an interview with Zhukov that has previously not been available in English. Zhukov's autobiography is an essential text for readers who are keen to deepen their understanding of how Stalin and his generals conducted the war on the Eastern Front.

The German Soldier in World War II

How close did Germany come to winning World War II? Did Hitler throw away victory in Europe after his troops had crushed the Soviet field armies defending Moscow by August 1941? R.H.S. Stolfi offers a dramatic new picture of Hitler's conduct in World War II and a fundamental reinterpretation of the course of the war. Adolf Hitler generally is thought to have been driven by a blitzkrieg mentality in the years 1939 to 1941. In fact, Stolfi argues, he had no such outlook on the war. From the day Britain and France declared war, Hitler reacted with a profoundly conservative cast of mind and pursued a circumscribed strategy, pushing out siege lines set around Germany by the Allies. Interpreting Hitler as a siege Führer explain his apparent aberrations in connection with Dunkirk, his fixation on the seizure of Leningrad, and his fateful decision in the summer of 1941 to deflect Army Group Center into the Ukraine when both Moscow and victory in World War II were within its reach. Unaware of Hitler's siege orientation, the German Army planned blitz campaigns. Through daring operational concepts and bold tactics, the army won victories over several Allied powers in World War II, and these led to the great campaign against the Soviet Union in summer of 1941. Stolfi postulates that in August 1941, German Army Group Center had the strength both to destroy the Red field armies defending the Soviet capital and to advance to Moscow and beyond. The defeat of the Soviet Union would have assured victory in World War II. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered the army group south to secure the resources of the Ukraine against a potential siege. And a virtually assured German victory slipped away. This radical reinterpretation of Hitler and the capabilities of the German Army leads to a reevaluation of World War II, in which the lesson to be learned is not how the Allies won the war, but how close the Germans came to a quick and decisive victory?long before the United States was drawn into the battle.

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Defense

Over 500,000 Jews fought under the Soviet banner in World War Two, of which an approximate 40 percent gave their lives - the highest percentage of all the nations of the Soviet Union and among all the other nations that fought in the Second World War. Dr. Arad now sets the record straight on the immense contribution of Soviet Jewry in the battle against Nazi Germany, a part of history long concealed by the Soviet government. After outlining the military progress of the war, the book documents the contributions of Soviet Jewry on the battlefronts and in the weapons development industry, in the ghetto undergrounds and in partisan warfare. In addition, the book records the Soviet government's deliberate attempts to downplay the Jewish effort and the anti-Semitism that Jewish soldiers and partisan groups suffered at the hands of the Soviet establishment, even while giving their lives for their country. Replete with the stories of individual heroes of all ranks, the book pays a debt of gratitude to those who paid the ultimate price to achieve our victory.

Soviet Military Operational Art

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Stalin and the Bomb

Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice. The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. The material for this study was obtained from Germany military records now in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of these monographs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, include Generaloberst Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army from 1938-1942; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and group commander on the Russian front; and several others. The study was written by George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presentation, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Russia in World War II.

Inside Hitler's High Command

When Hitler ordered the start of Operation Barbarossa, millions of German soldiers flooded into Russia, believing that their rapid blitzkrieg tactics would result in the an easy victory similar to the ones enjoyed by the Wehrmacht over Poland and France. But the huge human resources at the disposal of the Soviet Union, and the significant distances and overstretched

supply lines that the Germans had to overcome, saw the seemingly invincible armored spearheads start to slow. Finally, in sight of Moscow, the German invasion ground to a halt. Hitler's dreams of a quick victory were shattered and the ensuing war of attrition was to bleed Germany white, robbing her of manpower and equipment in one of the bloodiest episodes in human history. Fully illustrated with unique Osprey artwork, new maps, and contemporary photographs, Operation Barbarossa tells the story of one of the definitive campaigns of World War II and examines how the failure of the invasion contributed to the final defeat of Nazi Germany.

The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989

Glantz offers a definitive account of the forgotten catastrophe of Operation Mars, reveals the key players, and details the major events of the military disaster. 24 photos, 24 maps.

In the Shadow of the Red Banner

Infantry Soldier describes in harrowing detail the life of the men assigned to infantry rifle platoons during World War II. Few people realize the enormously disproportionate burden the men in these platoons carried: although only 6 percent of the U.S. Army in Europe. They suffered most of the casualties. George W. Neill served with a rifle platoon in the 99th Infantry Division. Now a seasoned journalist, he takes the reader into the foxholes to reveal how combat infantrymen lived and survived, what they thought, and how they fought. Beginning with basic training in Texas and Oklahoma, Neill moves to the front lines in Belgium and Germany. There he focuses on the role of his division in the Battle of the Bulge. The 99th, recruits bolstered by veterans of the 2nd Division, held the northern line of the bulge, preventing a German breakthrough and undermining their strategy. Using his wartime letters, his research in the United States and Europe, and hundreds of interviews, Neill chronicles his and his friends' experiences—acts of horror and heroism on the front line.

War of the Rats

The Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Churchill's Deception searches for the identity of a spy called "Werther," a German turncoat who provided the Russians with invaluable intelligence information during the war.

Marshal of Victory

A visual history of the German soldier on the Eastern Front of World War II.

Stalingrad

The historical record of the development and use of airborne forces has hitherto been blurred by neglect, secrecy and misinformation. This book uncovers the truth and sets the record straight. Using newly released and formerly classified Soviet archival sources and German sources never before seen in the West, the work provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the performance of Soviet airborne forces in peace and war.

Hitler's Traitor

Published in 1989, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

Operation Barbarossa

A look at the German High Command during World War II challenges the myth that the German Generals could have won the war had Hitler not interfered, and maps out the history and the personalities of the German Command Structure.

The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986

This is the first book to document, analyze, and interpret the history of the Warsaw Pact based on the archives of the alliance itself. As suggested by the title, the Soviet bloc military machine that held the West in awe for most of the Cold War does not appear from the inside as formidable as outsiders often believed, nor were its strengths and weaknesses the same at different times in its surprisingly long history, extending for almost half a century.

The German Campaign in Russia

One of America's most distinguished military historians offers the definitive account of the greatest tank battle of World War II—an epic clash of machines and men that matched the indomitable will of the Soviet Red Army against the awesome might of the Nazi Wehrmacht. While the Battle of Kursk has long captivated World War II aficionados, it has been unjustly overlooked by historians. Drawing on the masses of new information made available by the opening of the Russian military archives, Dennis Showalter at last corrects that error. This battle was the critical turning point on World War II's Eastern Front. In the aftermath of the Red Army's brutal repulse of the Germans at Stalingrad, the stakes could not have been higher. More than three million men and eight thousand tanks met in the heart of the Soviet Union, some four hundred

miles south of Moscow, in an encounter that both sides knew would reshape the war. The adversaries were at the peak of their respective powers. On both sides, the generals and the dictators they served were in agreement on where, why, and how to fight. The result was a furious death grapple between two of history's most formidable fighting forces—a battle that might possibly have been the greatest of all time. In *Armor and Blood*, Showalter re-creates every aspect of this dramatic struggle. He offers expert perspective on strategy and tactics at the highest levels, from the halls of power in Moscow and Berlin to the battlefield command posts on both sides. But it is the author's exploration of the human dimension of armored combat that truly distinguishes this book. In the classic tradition of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*, Showalter's narrative crackles with insight into the unique dynamics of tank warfare—its effect on men's minds as well as their bodies. Scrupulously researched, exhaustively documented, and vividly illustrated, this book is a chilling testament to man's ability to build and to destroy. When the dust settled, the field at Kursk was nothing more than a wasteland of steel carcasses, dead soldiers, and smoking debris. The Soviet victory ended German hopes of restoring their position on the Eastern Front, and put the Red Army on the road to Berlin. *Armor and Blood* presents readers with what will likely be the authoritative study of Kursk for decades to come. Advance praise for *Armor and Blood* "The size and the brutality of the vast tank battle at Kursk appalls, this struggle that gives an especially dark meaning to that shopworn phrase 'last full measure.' Prepare yourself for a wild and feverish ride over the steppes of Russia. You can have no better guide than Dennis E. Showalter, who speaks with an authority equaled by few military historians."—Robert Cowley, founding editor of *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* "A fresh, skillful, and complete synthesis of recent revelations about this famous battle . . . As a myth buster, *Armor and Blood* is a must-read for those interested in general and military history."—David M. Glantz, editor of *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* "Refreshingly crisp, pointed prose . . . Throughout, [Showalter] demonstrates his adeptness at interweaving discussions of big-picture strategy with interesting revelations and anecdotes. . . . Showalter does his best work by keeping his sights set firmly on the battle at hand, while also parsing the conflict for developments that would have far-reaching consequences for the war."—Publishers Weekly

Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk

The definitive work on Stalin's purges, the author's *The Great Terror* was universally acclaimed when it first appeared in 1968. It was "hailed as the only scrupulous, nonpartisan, and adequate book on the subject". And in recent years it has received equally high praise in the Soviet Union, where it is now considered the authority on the period, and has been serialized in *Neva*, one of their leading periodicals. Of course, when the author wrote the original volume two decades ago, he relied heavily on unofficial sources. Now, with the advent of glasnost, an avalanche of new material is available, and he has mined this enormous cache to write a substantially new edition of his classic work. It is remarkable how many of the most disturbing conclusions have born up under the light of fresh evidence. But the author has added enormously to the detail, including hitherto secret information on the three great "Moscow Trials," on the fate of the executed generals, on the

methods of obtaining confessions, on the purge of writers and other members of the intelligentsia, on life in the labor camps, and many other key matters. Both a leading Sovietologist and a highly respected poet, the author blends research with prose, providing not only an authoritative account of Stalin's purges, but also a compelling chronicle of one of this century's most tragic events. A timely revision of a book long out of print, this is the updated version of the author's original work.

Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War

The Soviet Military Experience is the first general work to place the Soviet army into its true social, political and international contexts. It focuses on the Bolshevik Party's intention to create an army of a new type, whose aim was both to defend the people and propagate Marxist ideals to the rest of the world. It includes discussion of the: * origins of the Workers and Peasant's Red Army * effects of the Civil War * Bolshevik regime's use of the military as a school of socialism * effects of collectivization and rapid industrialisation of the 1920s and 1930s * Second World War and its profound repercussions * ethnic tensions within the army * effect of Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika

Zhukov's Greatest Defeat

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.

The Soviet High Command: a Military-political History, 1918-1941

In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack." A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned

by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz' claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz' dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz' views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz' view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.

500 Days

A dramatic countdown of the final months of World War II in Europe, *The Last 100 Days* brings to life the waning power and the ultimate submission of the Third Reich. To reconstruct the tumultuous hundred days between Yalta and the fall of Berlin, John Toland traveled more than 100,000 miles in twenty-one countries and interviewed more than six hundred people—from Hitler's personal chauffeur to Generals von Manteuffel, Wenck, and Heinrici; from underground leaders to diplomats; from top Allied field commanders to brave young GIs. Toland adeptly weaves together these interviews using research from thousands of primary sources. When it was first published, *The Last 100 Days* made history, revealing after-action reports, staff journals, and top-secret messages and personal documents previously unavailable to historians. Since that time, it has come to be regarded as one of the greatest historical narratives of the twentieth century.

Infantry Soldier

The Soviet Airborne Experience

This book aims to furnish a history of the origins and development of Soviet military leadership, together with a survey of its

relations with the Communist Party and the governmental apparatus, within the chronological limits of the first attempts to organise the Red Army and a military command.

Stalin's Wars

In April 1942, Hitler and Mussolini meet in Salzburg where they agree on a renewed assault on the Soviet Union. Launched in the summer, the campaign soon picked up speed, as the routed Red Army is driven back to the industrial center of Stalingrad on the banks of the Volga. In the rubble of the bombed-out city, Soviet forces dig in for a last stand. Even as the Germans advance, the Shaposhnikov matriarch, Alexandra Vladimirovna, refuses to leave Stalingrad. Far from the front, her eldest daughter, Ludmila, is unhappily married to the Jewish physicist Viktor Shtrum. Viktor's research may be of crucial military importance, but he is distracted by thoughts of his mother in the Ukraine, lost behind German lines. -- adapted from back cover

A Cardboard Castle?

“THE principles of conduct of war and conduct of combat as expounded in this book by Field Marshal General Ritter Wilhelm von Leeb were written only a few years before the present war. “Von Leeb realistically and meticulously examined and re-examined the existing conceptions of defense to analyze what of value remained from World War I. He originally published his theories in the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (“The Scientific Military Review”) of the German War Office. They were later issued in book form, under the title *Die Abwehr*, in Berlin in 1938, and appear for the first time in English translation in this work. “In his *DEFENSE* von Leeb, as a military thinker and scientist, comparable to any of the outstanding authorities of the old German army—Schlieffen, Falkenhayn, Groner, Seeckt, etc.—offered his government a plan for the next war in which Germany might be engaged. It is estimated by competent judges as probably “the most important piece of research in the field of strategy and tactics in modern warfare that has appeared in a decade.””

The American Review on the Soviet Union

An objective and documentary history of the earliest origins and formative years of the Workers-Peasants Red Army from the Civil War to the initial disasters of the war with Germany, the Great Patriotic War, culminating in the "battle for Moscow" in November-December 1941.

The Great Terror

"The study makes extensive use of Soviet military histories, specialist military monographs, Red Army regulations, military manuals and handbooks, memoirs, documentary collections on Soviet military organization and Army-Party relations. Unpublished captured German military documents describe the secret Red Army-Reichswehr collaboration. Japanese Army records provide detailed information on the Soviet military build-up in the Far East."

The Culture of Military Organizations

"This report charts the stormy course of high-level Soviet civil-military relations from 1976 to 1986; and it assesses the sources, dynamics, and implications of the policy debates and political conflicts that have occurred between members of the civilian leadership and members of the high command. In particular, the study examines the civil-military tensions generated by escalating disagreements over doctrine and resource allocations and the ways in which these tensions have influenced and been influenced by factional struggles and personnel changes within both the civilian leadership and the high command. It also seeks to determine whether the severe tensions of the past decade are temporary aberrations or whether they are likely to persist--and, if they persist, what that might portend by way of continuity or change in Soviet policies and priorities."--Rand abstracts.

The History of Soviet Airborne Forces

A gripping and authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941-1942 Germany's winter campaign of 1941-1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In *Retreat from Moscow*, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy's strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative. Hitler's strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army's offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories. Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf's Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler's capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers' diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order

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